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the area, particularly within Anglo-American philosophy, was influenced by
the methodological assumptions of logical positivism. Theorists tended to
share the positivistic contention that because moral propositions were inca-
pable of consistent replication they could not be subjects of scientific
inquiry. Normative questions were therefore generally frowned upon because
of their alleged lack of scientific rigour. Dismissing the historical tradition of
Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau and Kant, theorists instead directed their
attention toward empirical investigations of matters of fact and analysis of
the logical and linguistic coherence of concepts. The philosophical approach
that most prospered in this constraining environment was utilitarianism. Its
preoccupation with logic and statistical analysis exemplified the narrow scope
and aridness that characterised the field as a whole. The arrival of A Theory of
Justice decisively shattered this status quo. Its call for a return to a Kantian
moral theory posed two critical challenges to conventional philosophical
thinking. 
First, Rawls squarely confronted the positivist notion that intuitive moral
convictions could not be usefully examined by philosophy. Rawls argued that,
while the nature of human reason prevented incontrovertible conclusions, it
did not preclude a meaningful understanding of principles of justice. If we
apply the same rules of analysis that we apply elsewhere in philosophical
inquiry, Rawls argued, we can arrive at a meaningful, albeit provisional, under-
standing of what we think is just. Citing Henry Sidgwick in his support,
Rawls wrote that moral philosophy should be considered an attempt to state
'in full breadth and clearness those primary intuitions of Reason, by the sci-
entific application of which the common moral thought of mankind may be
at once systematized and corrected'.3 By employing a systematic and ongo-
ing process of self-reflection that he called 'reflective equilibrium', philoso-
phy could therefore break out of its self-imposed straitjacket and return to
investigating matters of real substance.
Second, Rawls issued a penetrating Kantian critique of utilitarianism. Rawls
insisted that any theory of justice had to be premised on the immutable 'sep-
arateness of persons'; the idea, in other words, that each individual is a sepa-
rate life, and a separate centre of moral value. Once we accept this principle,
the formula for achieving social welfare proposed by utilitarianism becomes
unsustainable. The apparent rationality of determining the well-being of a
society on the basis of the sum of the welfare of each individual simply
masked the plural experience of individuals. There is no such entity as soci-
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It is not always easy fully to appreciate the influence John Rawls has had on
political philosophy. A conceptual landscape comprised of the language of
human rights, social justice and the basis of political authority has become so
familiar to us that it is hard to imagine a world substantially different. Yet
things were very different not so long ago. And it was Rawls's intervention
that was largely responsible for ushering in the era in which we currently find
ourselves. Rawls's work served to revitalise an intellectually moribund field by
establishing a common project of philosophical inquiry. By providing an
approach that resonated across disciplinary and methodological boundaries,
Rawls single-handedly injected a new energy into normative inquiry and
brought a common purpose to a previously fragmented and dispirited field.
The major significance of his work was not that it provided incontrovertible
answers to imposing questions; Rawls's conclusions did not command uni-
versal assent. What gave his work far-reaching impact was its ability to pro-
vide a compelling way of thinking about the pressing concerns faced by mod-
ern liberal societies. Rawls's synthesis of different philosophical traditions
within a single framework gave powerful impetus to the emergence of a com-
mon disciplinary discourse on these issues. Specifically, Rawls provided a
framework to consider the principles that would have to be embodied in
political institutions to elicit the willing cooperation of persons within soci-
eties deeply divided on moral, religious and philosophical grounds. Rawls's
ability to tap into current philosophical and political predilections in posing
this question ensured that he made a deep and enduring impression on theo-
retical debate. As Robert Nozick, one of Rawls's most prominent critics,
aptly put it, 'political philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theo-
ry or explain why not'.1
Rawls's impact is best understood by considering the state of moral and polit-
ical philosophy prior to the publication of his first book, A Theory of Justice,
in 1971.2 In many respects the field was in poor shape. Much of the work in
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able to a secular liberal committed to individual liberty. 
Rawls invoked a deceptively simple device to conceive of how these differ-
ences might be overcome. Rather than trying to make fair and sympathetic
judgements with full information, Rawls asked us to imagine what principles
individuals would agree on if they were placed under what he described as a
'veil of ignorance'. Under these circumstances, individuals would be denied
knowledge of their talents, endowments and particular conceptions of the
good life in the resulting society. Constrained in this way, Rawls argued that
individuals would not be willing to gamble on the advantages or disadvan-
tages that fate might deal them. If they did not know whether they would be
winners or losers, intelligent or simpleminded, Christians, Jews, Muslims or
atheists, they would only be willing to sign up for arrangements that would
protect them whatever happened. 
Arguing along these lines, Rawls concluded that parties would insist on a very
strong priority for basic liberties because they would not want to risk being
put in a situation where a majority prevented the free exercise of a minority
culture or belief. Individuals put in this 'original position' would recognise the
necessity of individual autonomy to life as free and equal persons, and there-
fore would readily assent to the protection of individual liberty as an absolute
priority. This was Rawls's first principle, that each person should have a right
to as much freedom as is compatible with others enjoying the same right. 
His second principle claimed that the parties would prefer a distribution of
basic goods that would tolerate inequalities only when they raised the level of
the least well off. This was egalitarian in the sense that it did not allow
inequalities simply on the basis of 'merit' or natural endowment. Rawls
argued that, just as it was unfair for someone to be excluded from material
rewards on the basis of race or gender, it was also unfair for inequalities in
natural talents to determine outcomes. No one deserves to be born handi-
capped, or with an IQ of 140, and thus natural endowments should not be
allowed to determine someone's material fate. Distributive shares should not
be influenced by factors that are essentially arbitrary. Instead of allowing indi-
viduals to reap the benefits of being born intelligent, for example, we should
regard material resources as the product of a cooperative venture in which we
all have a stake. Our priority in distributing these resources should be to
improve the lot of the least well off. This did not mean that egalitarian out-
comes were themselves the goal. Inequalities would be permissible if they
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ety to experience this aggregate well-being; winners' gains do not outweigh
losers' losses, or as Rawls put it, 'Justice denies that the loss of freedom for
some is made right by a greater good shared by others'. What we should
recognise is that there are simply distinct persons with separate ends whose
unique moral status should be the object of a theory of justice. 'Each person
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society
as a whole cannot override.'4 For Rawls, it was not enough to say of a soci-
ety that it was doing well on the whole, in the aggregate, or so far as average
per capita income was concerned. A just society was one that advanced the
good of each and every one of its members so that there was no one from
whose plight we would have to avert our eyes.
These theoretical challenges opened the way for the field of moral and polit-
ical philosophy to break out from its depressed state. A Theory of Justice
offered a sophisticated model for how philosophy could productively apply
itself to substantive ethical questions. The painstaking rigour Rawls demon-
strated in building his case banished any sense that this return to grand the-
ory involved a regression to any kind of woolly thinking. Analytical philoso-
phers could be satisfied that this was indeed a legitimate line of inquiry that
could prove fruitful. In terms of broad political concerns, Rawls's insistence
on the moral inviolability of every individual reconnected the field to the
growing public discourse of human rights. Rawls provided a theoretical ratio-
nale for the postwar resurgence of rights talk initiated by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Under Rawls's remit, philosophy could no
longer be accused of shying away from the pressing substantive issues - the
protection of basic rights, how societies should address inequalities, etc. - that
animated political debate.
Rawls's substantive theory followed from this Kantian starting point. If all
individuals are considered moral equals, it follows that the social arrange-
ments that govern society should be valid to everyone. Finding common
ground, however, is far from easy in any society, given the myriad of differ-
ences that distinguish us from each other. How are we likely to come to an
agreement on the principles that govern society when our particular circum-
stances and beliefs will lead us to favour very different arrangements?
Someone who is born with exceptional talents, for example, will be likely to
favour a system in which rewards are distributed on the basis of merit.
Similarly, someone with traditional religious beliefs might support the
enforcement of certain moral standards; a position that would be unaccept-
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But the interest in Rawls's theory of distributive justice has waned in the face
of the ascendancy of neo-liberal political thinking beginning in the 1980s.
Increasingly, the relevance of Rawls's work has been seen instead in the light
of whether it provides a credible foundation for a political community com-
mitted to individual liberty. 
On the one hand, Rawls's work has been a subject for the general attack on
liberalism that focuses on the difficulties faced in achieving liberal consensus
within modern multicultural societies. The key question raised here is
whether Rawls's formula for liberal consensus would actually prove stable
within a pluralist society in which there are diverse ways of life and forms of
culture. Rawls's first principle of justice, the assent of individuals to the prin-
ciple of maximised individual freedom, is thus put into question. On what
basis would individuals be expected to endorse this principle? Would they be
expected, having adopted the perspective of free and equal individuals in the
'original position', simply to substitute this liberal creed for their prior moral
outlook? To many this seemed an unrealistic requirement for a multicultural
society. How could we expect members of certain religious communities, for
example, to accept the idea of individual autonomy when it was so inimical
to their existing moral outlook?6
Whereas these 'multicultural' critics identify problems with the universal
applicability of liberal values, other critics have attacked Rawls for not mak-
ing these common principles robust enough. This particular critique has been
given new urgency by a widely shared sense that a culture of individualism,
rooted in liberalism itself, has contributed to a breakdown of communal val-
ues in modern liberal societies. Motivated by these concerns, many critics
have indicted Rawls's theory for failing to generate the type of cohesion nec-
essary for a viable political community. 7
Rawls acknowledged the force of these arguments and sought to revise his
theory in Political Liberalism, published in 1993.8 Responding to his critics, he
accepted that it was untenable to suppose that liberalism would be endorsed
as a comprehensive doctrine in which the values of autonomy and individu-
ality would extend into all or most areas of life. Stability required a much
looser, non-metaphysical conception that would be hospitable to people who
held many different views about the good life. But while individuals did not
have to accept an encompassing notion of liberal tolerance, they did have to
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could demonstrate that they produced the best possible outcome for the
worst off. For example, doctors could be paid more if it brought about bet-
ter health care for the poor. Wage differentials could be justified on the basis
of providing an incentive for the poor to better themselves. Ultimately, Rawls
argued, when forced to think from the perspective of the 'original position',
we would recognise that it was not just to allow natural talents, or any other
arbitrary trait, to dictate the distribution of resources.    
Rawls's use of the 'original position', and the resultant logic he attributed to
individuals placed in these circumstances, aroused considerable controversy.
Critics, such as Charles Taylor, disputed the usefulness of conceiving indi-
viduals as reasoning independently of each other. Moral judgement is not
simply a process of self-reflection but also a dialogical process by which we
integrate, reflect upon, and modify our own ideas with those of people with
whom we come into contact. To set up the 'original position' in such atom-
istic terms simply encourages a self-interested logic in the conclusions that
are drawn.5
Those that accepted this individualistic premise were not always satisfied with
the logic that Rawls imputed to individuals. It was unrealistic, they argued,
that individuals would be so risk-averse in their choices. Why would individ-
uals not choose, for example, a society that tolerated wide inequalities but
avoided destitution by provision of a welfare safety net. Surely we would be
just as likely to behave as moderate risk takers if placed in the 'original posi-
tion' than as conservative hedge-betters? 
Perhaps the deftest assault on Rawls's distributive theory was Nozick's
Anarchy, State and Utopia. Nozick argued that it was a fallacy to consider soci-
ety as a cooperative endeavour in which the fruits of one's efforts did not
belong to oneself. Resources are not 'common assets', Nozick charged, but
the rightful property of individuals. The distribution of resources should be
determined by free transfer between rightful owners, not by an overarching
mechanism that owners do not assent to. But the force of Nozick's attack was
muted by his failure to provide a specific account of the merit of individual
ownership. Rawls's perspective, by contrast, seemed to resonate with the pre-
vailing rationale of the postwar welfare state. The outcomes generated by the
market seemed so unrelated to individual merit that it appeared perfectly rea-
sonable to impose a distributive mechanism to ensure some degree of fair-
ness in results.  
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accommodating and eschew controversy has left it weak in terms of provid-
ing reasons for people to act on it. The agnostic commitment to tolerance
that characterises political liberalism fails to foster the dispositions and
virtues necessary to preserve and strengthen liberal institutions and practices.
The appeal to individual autonomy is too weakly formulated. At best, it seems
to encourage a hands-off, mind-one's-own-business spirit of tolerance; at
worst, it encourages an individualistic emphasis on personal rights and inter-
ests. In either case, Rawls's political liberalism seems to be self-defeating, for
it lacks the motivational force necessary to inspire people to act as they need
to act if liberal societies are to survive and prosper. Hence the justificatory
force of political liberalism seems to be at odds with the motivational needs
of the theory. 10
But perhaps this is the price we pay for a consensus on liberal values in the
modern world. Just as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf had seen enough
bloodshed caused by moral disagreement in the sixteenth century to counte-
nance a 'thick' moral doctrine, so the experience of totalitarianism in the
twentieth century may have warned us of the possible dangers of a more
stringent requirement. Burdened by recent history, we may have become
jaundiced with the capacity for moral agreement between human beings. But,
on the other hand, our familiarity with intractable cultural diversity in mod-
ern societies may have made us acutely aware of the immense difficulty in
forging a liberal consensus. Rawls's lasting legacy may be his ability to coher-
ently articulate these concerns without falling prey to scepticism. By provid-
ing us with a plausible moral basis for liberal institutions without presuppos-
ing any controversial or contentious moral outlook, Rawls has left us with
grounds for optimism that liberal democracies can actually endure under
modern conditions. 
Roland Marden is currently preparing a manuscript that examines theories
of citizenship in the light of eighteenth century Anglo-American languages
of rights. He is a lecturer in American Studies at the University of Sussex.
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accept a 'thin' conception of it. A defence of toleration that rested entirely
on pragmatic grounds would not do the job, Rawls insisted. Such a modus
vivendi - a strategic compromise between contending social groups - would
only retain its force as long as the necessary balance of power in society was
preserved. If one group gained enough strength so that a policy of intoler-
ance came to seem tempting, the pragmatic argument would provide no rea-
son to resist the temptation. 
Rawls's solution steered a course that avoided both this Hobbesian nominal-
ism and an all-encompassing liberal doctrine. Individuals would have to
accept the moral appeal of tolerance, but only in regards to the political
sphere. Liberal tolerance would have a much greater appeal once it was
detached from a broader liberal vision of the good life. People's reasons for
accepting the political conception could vary depending on which compre-
hensive moral doctrine they affirmed. Nonetheless, an overlapping consensus
would arise as individuals viewed the political conception as derived from, or
congruent with, their other values. Such a political liberalism would thus be
endorsed as the most reasonable doctrine by individuals whatever their par-
ticular comprehensive beliefs. This was a chastened liberalism that attempted
to accommodate moral diversity while remaining substantive enough to
secure an enduring political association. 
Rawls's attempt to make liberalism more accommodating, while retaining its
moral core, was bound to draw criticism. Critics who were dissatisfied with
the 'thin' liberalism presented by The Theory of Justice have been even less
happy with the revised theory presented in Political Liberalism. Critics have
redoubled their efforts to argue that the credibility of a public commitment
to individual autonomy in fact requires the support of a comprehensive
moral vision. An agnostic stance toward its key principle, they argue, robs lib-
eralism of its essential rationale. As Michael Sandel has pointed out, Rawls's
insistence on neutrality has far-reaching, perhaps unwelcome implications for
the type of reasoning that is acceptable in the public sphere. The idea of a
political conception of liberal tolerance prohibits appeal to a comprehensive
moral doctrine. For example, gay couples arguing in support of their civil
right to marry are prevented from claiming in public debate that their life-
style is just as worthy of respect as that of heterosexuals. Instead, their only
grounds of defence are that the law should not engage in any moral judge-
ment regarding life-style.9
Other critics argue that Rawls's determination to make his liberal doctrine
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